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Trimbak Shastri, PhD, CA, CMA, CIA, University of Louisville, USA

ABSTRACT
Prior studies found that companies with internal control deficiencies incorporate abnormal
accounting accruals into their financial statements. However, these studies did not consider the
materiality of abnormal accruals. Abnormal accruals should be within materiality when financial
statements receive clean audit opinions. When material internal control weaknesses (MICW) exist,
to compensate for additional risk, auditors should apply more audit effort to gain the quantity and
quality of evidence necessary to obtain a reasonable degree of assurance to support their audit
reports. We find evidence of this because audit fees are significantly higher for MICW companies
than those for effective internal controls (EIC) companies in our sample. Accordingly, financial
statements receiving clean audit opinions should not contain material abnormal accruals
irrespective of whether controls are effective EIC or ineffective MICW. To examine this issue, we
use post-SOX data to estimate abnormal accruals using a revenue-based accrual model for a
matched sample of companies with clean audit opinions on their financial statements: one-half
EIC and the other half with MICW. Then, we establish material abnormal revenue accruals
(MARA), which is the difference between estimated abnormal revenue accruals and a quantitative
materiality based on assets. Finally, we compare MARA between EIC and MICW companies. We
find no significant difference in MARA between EIC and MICW companies. We provide a
summary of important findings in Table 3, and conclude with suggestions to further improve audit
and financial reporting quality.
Keywords: Material Internal Control Weakness; Earnings Management; Internal Control Deficiencies

I.

INTRODUCTION

M

any papers have been written regarding earnings management, which involves management’s
intervention to misstate reported earnings through various means for gainful purpose. Some recent
academic studies indicate that companies with internal control deficiencies are likely to
incorporate abnormal accounting accruals into their financial statements (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008; and Doyle.et
al., 2007). Former SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt, Jr., indicated (JofA 1998) various approaches are used by
enterprises to misstate earnings, including: abuse of materiality, accelerating revenue recognition, use of “cookie-jar
reserves”, and “big bath charges”. The purpose of this study is to test, for companies that receive unqualified
(clean) audit opinions on their financial statements, whether earnings management after the adoption of PCAOB
standards is more prevalent in companies with material internal control weaknesses (MICW) than in companies that
have effective internal controls (EIC). For this test, we examined financial data and audit fees of a sample of public
companies.
According to a 2002-GAO report on Financial Statement Restatement, 20 percent of SEC’s enforcement
cases in the late 1990s to early 2000s were for violations resulting from financial reporting and accounting practices
(GAO 2002). Further, other matters that enabled management to manage earnings included, for example, difficult to
implement accounting standards (e.g., accounting for fair values), compensation schemes, and auditors yielding to
© 2013 The Clute Institute http://www.cluteinstitute.com/
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management pressures. Ineffective internal controls (together with aggressive accounting practices by management)
might facilitate misappropriation of assets and misleading or fraudulent financial reporting, (such as that at
WorldCom and Enron).
To strengthen the effectiveness of internal controls (and other corporate governance related matters), the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was enacted in 2002. The SOX Act established the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB) to monitor the accounting industry to protect the interests of investors in public
companies. In this regard, the PCAOB has issued several auditing Standards (AS1-AS15), and adopted some of the
AICPA’s auditing standards as interim standards. Specifically, Section 404 of the SOX Act requires the annual report
of a public company to include management’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting
(ICFR). PCAOB AS2, which came into effect in 2004, requires auditors to integrate an audit of financial statements
with the audit of ICFR, and attest to and report on the assessment made by company management.
For 2004 fiscal year ends, over 2,500 public companies reported according to AS2. Of the reporting
companies, approximately 15% reported one or more material internal control weaknesses that resulted in auditors
issuing adverse opinions on ICFR (Foster et al., 2007). In 2007, PCAOB replaced AS2 with AS5 (which became
effective for fiscal years ending on or after November 15, 2007) to make compliance with standards more efficient,
e.g., by recommending a top-down approach to audit internal control (IC), amending definitions of material IC
weaknesses, and not requiring auditors to report on management’s assessment of internal control. This study examines
financial reports from 2009, well after adoption of the SOX Act and PCAOB auditing standards, to provide insight
into recent earnings management related actions, and whether the quality of financial reporting can be enhanced.
As expected, our analyses revealed that auditors expended more effort examining MICW companies than
EIC companies; MICW companies with positive (income increasing) material abnormal accruals (MARA) were
subjected to the highest level of audit scrutiny. We also found that companies with EIC exhibit as much or more
MARA as those with MICW. (Other contributions to our understanding of auditing and accruals for MICW and
EIC companies are included in Table 3.) We also recommend reporting changes to make the financial reporting
process relatively more transparent. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the role
of audits in limiting earnings management and presents research questions. Section III describes the approach used
to address research questions, data analyses and results. Concluding comments with suggestions to improve quality
of audits and financial reporting are presented in Section IV.
II.

ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING & EARNINGS MANAGEMENT

Management is responsible for implementing effective internal control over financial reporting. In addition,
to improve the quality of accounting information for reporting, company managers frequently take steps to
strengthen other governance related matters. For example, studies indicate that engaging experienced auditors for
audits (Mansi et al., 2004; Myers et al., 2003) and appointing former audit partners to audit committees is likely to
enhance the quality of financial reporting (Naiker and Sharma 2009). Generating good quality accounting
information requires the joint efforts of management, the audit committee, and auditors.
Audits as a Deterrent to Earnings Management
Irrespective of internal control effectiveness, financial statements audited in accordance with PCAOB
standards and receiving a clean audit opinion should contain accounting accruals within the bounds of GAAP and be
free of material misstatements. However, in the pre-PCAOB environment, auditors appear to have failed to follow
prescribed standards in many audits. For example, the 2002-GAO’s report (referred above) indicated that from
January 2001, to February 2002, about 25% of accounting-related cases brought by the SEC involved accounting
firms and certified public accountants (CPAs).
Auditors follow several steps to effectively plan and execute an integrated audit. One step requires
evaluation of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting according to PCAOB AS5 to determine
appropriate audit procedures. If controls are weak, auditors likely perform a more extensive audit by appropriately
varying the nature, timing, and extent of audit procedures (and consequently charge higher audit fees) than when
184
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internal controls are strong. Collectively, internal controls and audit procedures act as screens/filters to prevent,
detect and appropriately rectify material misstatements, if any, to ensure that financial statements conform to GAAP
(see figure/exhibit).

Accrual-accounting, which includes estimates and allocations, by its very nature is likely to allow swings
(back and forth) in earnings that are not planned by management and are acceptable to auditors, within certain
bounds of materiality. Effective audits are likely to identify/prevent management from incorporating abnormalaccruals that exceed materiality into the financial statements. A previous study found that audits did limit earnings
management and that most earnings management occurred within the boundaries of GAAP (Butler et al. 2004).
Consequently, a reasonable question is whether the SOX Act and PCAOB oversight limited earnings management
through accounting accruals manipulation by public companies receiving clean audit opinions, irrespective of
whether the company has effective internal controls (EIC) or material internal control weaknesses (MICW).
This study is designed to first verify whether companies with material internal control weaknesses (MICW)
receiving unqualified audit opinions on financial statements are indeed subjected to more audit scrutiny (using audit
fees as a proxy) compared to companies with effective internal controls receiving unqualified audit opinions on
financial statements. Second, we examine whether internal control effectiveness influences earnings management.
Because MICW companies are likely to be subjected to more audit scrutiny than EIC companies to obtain the level
of assurance necessary to receive ‘clean’ audit opinions, all accruals are likely to be within the bounds of
© 2013 The Clute Institute http://www.cluteinstitute.com/
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materiality; no difference in abnormal accounting accruals between MICW and EIC companies is likely to be found.
To examine these two issues, we present the following Research Questions:
RQ1:

For companies receiving clean/unqualified audit reports on financial statements, are audit fees significantly
higher for companies with MICW compared to those with EIC?

RQ2:

For companies receiving clean/unqualified audit reports on financial statements, do abnormal revenue
accruals exceeding materiality or material abnormal revenue accruals (MARA) significantly differ between
companies with material internal control weaknesses (MICW) and those with effective internal controls
(EIC)?

III.

DATA ANALYSES & RESULTS

To address the research questions, we examined financial data for a sample of EIC and MICW-companies
based on 2009 annual reports1. We analyzed abnormal accruals (particularly revenue accruals) exceeding a
quantitative materiality amount (e.g., 1% of assets) for these companies.
Sample (Accrual data for 81 MICW and comparable 81 EIC companies)
We randomly selected a sample of 81 companies with material internal control weaknesses (MICW)
receiving an adverse auditor’s report on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, but an
unqualified report on the financial statements for fiscal year 2009. We matched these MICW companies by total
assets and industry with 81 companies receiving clean audit reports on both the effectiveness of internal control
(EIC) and financial statements for fiscal year 2009. As indicated earlier, the (nature, timing, and extent of) audit
procedures performed should vary depending on the relative effectiveness of internal control. Details of analyses
and results are discussed next.
Audit fees as a proxy for audit effort and estimating material abnormal revenue accruals
Audit and audit related fees should reflect auditors’ efforts applied in audit engagements. We use audit
fees as proxy for audit effort. While audit fees directly relate to integrated audits, audit related fees may directly or
indirectly relate to integrated audits. Reporting of audit fees in proxy statements appears inconsistent across
companies2. Consequently, we separately analyze audit fees and audit plus audit-related fees (AU+ARfee) of
MICW and EIC companies.
A.

Materiality

For audit planning, quantitative materiality is based on “rules of thumb” such as: 5%-10% of pre-tax income;
½% to 1% of total assets or total revenues; or a sliding scale of percentages on the larger of total revenues or total
assets (SEC 1999; AICPA 2001). For materiality, we use the amount of total assets (at year-end), because total
assets are relatively more stable than earnings. Also, earnings could significantly fluctuate and the use of a loss
would not be appropriate for establishing quantitative materiality. The following table illustrates the differences in
materiality amount based on (i) sliding scale, and (ii) 1% of total assets:

1

Also, we examined a sample of financial statements for fiscal year 2004 soon after the implementation of AS2.
Some companies report no audit related fees, while others report substantial amounts of audit related fees. Companies reporting
audit related fees indicated that these fees relate to a variety of tasks undertaken by auditors in addition to the audit of financial
statements including: audit of internal control over financial reporting; services related to consultations on internal control over
financial reporting; attestation services related to operating expenses and special procedures related to regulatory SEC filings; and
audits of subsidiaries and audits or reviews of related financial statements such as employee benefit plans.
2
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Larger of total revenues
or total assets (assumed total
assets are larger)
$1,000,000
$10,000,000
$100,000,000
$300,000,000
$1,000,000,000

AICPA sliding scale based
Materiality as % of total
assets
1.84%
0.855%
0.396%
0.275%
0.184%

Materiality amount as per
AICPA’s sliding scale table
$18,400
$85,500
$396,000
$826,000
$1,840,000

Volume 29, Number 1
Materiality amount based on
1% of total assets
$10,000
$100,000
$1,000,000
$3,000,000
$10,000,000

The percentages of the base for materiality from the sliding scale declines as the size of assets or revenues
increases and would be relatively small for public companies with even a moderate level of assets or sales, such as
$10 million or more. For example, materiality using the sliding scale for a company with $10 million of assets
would be 0.855% of assets (or $ 85,500). Consequently, for companies with the larger of total revenues or total
assets ranging from $10 million to $1 billion (or more), an auditor’s materiality threshold could range from a high of
0.855% to a low of 0.184% of the base (assets or revenues) amount. An auditor might establish a planning-stage
materiality based on the sliding scale (e.g., less than 1% of assets), but for evaluation of uncorrected misstatements
(individually or in the aggregate) might increase the bounds of materiality to 1% of total assets. Consequently, we
use 1% of total assets (the upper bound of materiality) to establish a quantitative amount for materiality for
comparison with estimated abnormal revenue-accrual.
B.

Estimating material abnormal revenue-accruals (MARA)

Although accounting-accruals could relate to revenue, or expenses (or a combination), for data analyses we
focus on revenue-related accruals3. Estimating abnormal revenue-accrual might be relatively more reliable than the
other abnormal accrual estimation methods. A recent study (Stubben 2010) using extensive simulations examined
the effectiveness (robustness) of various existing “accrual models” that are used to estimate abnormal (revenue and
expense) accruals when examining earnings management-related issues. The study found that a revenue-based
model better identified earnings management (based on abnormal revenue-accruals) than traditional models used in
earnings management literature based on overall accruals.
Also, the 2002 GAO report (referred to above) that analyzed 919 restatements reported by 845 companies
from 1997 to 2002 indicated that revenue recognition issues were the primary reason for restatement each year-almost 38 percent of the restatements. Also, the GAO reported that restatements involving revenue recognition led
to greater market losses (estimated at over 50% more) than other restatement-types. To address a large number of
revenue recognition related issues encountered by companies, the SEC issued Staff Accounting Bulletins SAB No.
101 A&B (2000). Consequently, the accrual model used for this study focuses on revenues and accounts receivable.
The revenue-model used to estimate abnormal revenue accruals is based on the expectation that changes in
accounts receivable generally result from changes in revenue. The expected change in accounts receivable (the
dependent variable) for a company is estimated using a regression model run on all companies within its industry.
Company revenue changes in the previous year serve as independent variables, particularly the change in revenue in
the fourth quarter compared to the fourth quarter of the previous year.
Model: ΔAR = a +b1 ΔR1_3 + b2ΔR4 + e
where:
ΔAR =

reported accounts receivable at FY-end date (e.g., 12/31/2009) less reported accounts receivable at
preceding FY-end (e.g., 12/31/2008), [i.e., change in accounts receivable during the year]
ΔR1_3 = Sales from first three quarters of FY 2009 less sales from first three quarters of FY 2008, and
ΔR4 =
Sales from last quarter of FY 2009 less sales from last quarter of FY 2008.
3

Using the same sample we examined abnormal accounting accruals comprising of both revenue and expenses in combination,
the conclusions are substantially the same as revenue related accruals discussed in this paper. We are not including the details
regarding accruals of both revenue and expenses in combination.

© 2013 The Clute Institute http://www.cluteinstitute.com/
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The difference between this estimate and the actual change in accounts receivable reported in the financial
statements (residual from the equation) represents the estimated abnormal revenue-accrual (ARA).
The difference between the estimated abnormal revenue-accrual (ARA) and materiality amount based on
1% of total assets constitutes the material abnormal revenue-accrual (MARA). Ideally, for all audited financial
statements receiving a clean audit opinion, ARA should be within the bounds of materiality (and therefore MARA
should be zero). However, ARA could sometimes be outside the bounds of materiality resulting in a MARA. A
positive MARA results when ARA exceeds materiality, thereby overstating income (income increasing MARA). In
contrast, a negative MARA results when the absolute value of a negative ARA exceeds the materiality level (|-ARA|
> materiality) thereby understating income (income decreasing MARA).
Results of analyses
Descriptive data are shown in Table 1, separately in Panel-A for companies with effective internal controls
(EIC), and in Panel-B for companies with material internal control weaknesses (MICW). Within each panel,
averages are provided for several measures by MARA category (observations with positive MARA, negative
MARA, and those with ARA within materiality). Columns 3 and 4 contain the average sales and year-end assets,
respectively, of companies in each category. Columns 5 and 6 show the average materiality limit (1% of total
assets) and estimated ARA, respectively. Columns 7 and 8 express the average MARA and MARA as a percent of
assets, respectively, for the companies exhibiting positive and negative MARA. Audit fees as a percentage of yearend total assets, average total assets, and sales are shown under columns 9, 10, and 11 respectively, and similar
percentages for AU+ARfee are included under the last three columns 12, 13, and 14.

188
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Audit fees
As indicated above, the last six columns in Table 1 provide audit fees (columns 9 -11), and audit plus audit
related fees (columns 12-14) as a percentage of total assets and sales for EIC and MICW companies by MARA
category. Our analysis supports the contention that auditors likely exert more effort to obtain persuasive evidence to
achieve the same level of assurance for audits of MICW companies as that of EIC companies, and, consequently,
charge higher audit fees for audits of MICW companies. Table 2, reports p-values of t-tests for comparisons of
means of MICW and EIC companies for analysis items from Table 1 including AU+ARfees as a percent of assets
(per column 12, Table 1) and as a percent of sales (column 14, Table 1) for all companies (81 EIC and 81 MICW),
those with positive MARA (35 EIC and 33 MICW), and those with negative MARA (24 EIC and 23 MICW). (Note:
t-tests for comparisons of mean ratings between EIC and MICW companies for other audit fee related data included
under columns 9, 10, 11, & 13 in Table 1 are similar to those for audit and audit related fees for which p-values are
given in Table 2).

The average audit and audit related fees (AU+ARfee) as a percent of year end assets (column 12, Table 1)
for the 81 MICW companies (under Panel B) at 0.617% are significantly higher (p< 0.001) than AU+ARfee as
percent of year end assets for the 81 EIC companies (under Panel A) at 0.33%. AU+ARfee as percent of sales
(column 14) for all MICW companies at 1.18% is also significantly (p<0.001) higher compared to those of all 81
EIC companies at 0.442%. These results suggest, that MICW companies are subjected to more audit effort (audit
fees as a proxy), addressing Research Question #1. However, the impact of AU+ARfee of MICW and EIC
companies could differ depending on whether MARA was positive or negative.
Material abnormal accruals (MARA)
As mentioned previously, we anticipate no substantive difference between MARAs based on our sample of
MICW and EIC companies that received unqualified audit opinions; when issuing an unqualified audit opinion, the
auditor should obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to obtain a reasonable degree of assurance that the
financial statements are free of material misstatements irrespective of whether the company has effective internal
control (EIC) or material internal control weaknesses (MICW). As evidenced in our analysis of audit and audit
© 2013 The Clute Institute http://www.cluteinstitute.com/
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related fees, auditors would perform more extensive audit procedures on MICW companies to compensate for
internal control weaknesses.
As can be seen in Table 1, the number of companies identified as having MARA slightly differs between
EIC (35+24= 59) and MICW-companies (33+23 = 56). Overall, about 29% (22 EIC companies + 25 MICW = 47
out of 162) of sampled companies have accruals that are within the bounds of materiality, indicating presence of no
earnings management in these companies. The remaining 71% (59 EIC + 56 MICW = 115 out of 162) of companies
have either positive (income increasing) MARA or negative (income decreasing) MARA. If materiality is lowered
from 1% to ½% of ending assets, for example, the number of companies (22 or 29%) that have accruals within the
bounds of materiality would shrink further, thereby increasing the number of companies with positive or negative
MARA. However, auditors are likely to accept a maximum amount of uncorrected misstatements in financial
statements based on judgment. Here, we use 1% of assets as the maximum amount for uncorrected misstatements.
The last two rows of Table 2 report p-values of t-tests for comparisons of means between MICW and EIC
companies for MARA. The average positive MARA of the 35 EIC-companies at 8.022% of assets (per column 8Panel A) is relatively higher than the average positive MARA for the 33 MICW companies at 5.3% of assets.
However, the difference in MARA as a percentage of assets is not significant (p< 0.18). Although the difference is
not significant, a lower positive MARA for MICW companies at 5.3% (compared to that of EIC companies at
8.022%) could reflect MICW companies being subjected to more audit scrutiny compared to EIC companies. The
average negative MARA of 24 EIC-companies at -5.37% of assets does not differ substantively (p<0.84) from the
average negative MARA of 23 MICW companies at -5.8% of assets. Thus, results for the differences in both
positive and negative MARA as percent of assets between MICW and EIC companies suggest little difference
between the groups, addressing Research Question #2.
However, as indicated earlier 71% (115) of the 162 companies in our sample, show either positive (income
increasing) MARA or negative MARA. Such a large proportion (71%) of companies with MARA indicates the
likely existence of some level of earnings management in the post-SOX environment. Table 3 summarizes
important findings from our data analyses.
1.

2.
3.

4.

5.

Table 3: Summary of Results of Data Analyses
MICW companies have a lower average positive (income increasing) MARA (5.3%), but a larger average negative
(income decreasing) MARA (5.8%) compared to EIC companies’ average positive MARA (8%) and average negative
MARA (5.4%). These results indicate that audits appear to be tighter in connection with audits of MICW companies to
ensure that they do not overstate earnings.
Companies with material internal control weaknesses (MICW) elicit substantially more audit scrutiny (based on audit fees
as proxy) than companies with effective internal controls (EIC). (Table 2, Panel A vs. Panel B).
Of the MICW companies, those with income increasing material abnormal accruals (MARA) are subjected to the highest
level of audit scrutiny, suggesting auditors are most concerned when accruals for MICW companies tend to increase
income.
Irrespective of MICW or EIC, when auditors issue an unqualified audit opinion on the financial statements, they should
have obtained high levels of assurance that the financial statements are free of material misstatements. As expected, we
found no substantive difference in accrual quality after controlling for materiality (material abnormal accrual), irrespective
of whether internal controls are effective (EIC companies) or ineffective (MICW companies).
Results from the more recent data used in this study (compared to prior studies) indicate that PCAOB standards (e.g.,
relating to internal control over financial reporting and other standards) and PCAOB inspections appear to have enhanced
the quality of audits and financial statements.

Collectively, these results indicate that MICW companies are subjected to more audit scrutiny to
compensate for weak controls (and higher control risk level) than EIC companies, addressing Research Question #1.
Consequently, when issuing “clean” audit opinions on financial statements, auditors are required to obtain a
reasonable degree of assurance to support an unqualified audit opinion, irrespective of MICW or EIC companies.
Therefore, abnormal accruals, if any, between MICW and EIC should not differ (addressing Research Question #2) 4.
4

We analyzed 2004 annual reports and audit fees related data for 78 EIC and 78-MICW companies (soon after the adoption of
PCAOB auditing standards), which yielded similar results to those we obtained from our analyses of data based on 2009-annual
reports.
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Extensions of prior research
The above analyses are based on two improvements to most prior research: (i) computing abnormal
revenue accrual (ARA) using the revenue-model described earlier, which is considered relatively more robust than
other accrual models, and (ii) computing material abnormal accrual (MARA) based on a materiality threshold of 1%
of assets. However, the results of our analyses should be interpreted with caution, because (a) the revenue-model
may not accurately generate an estimated abnormal revenue accrual (ARA) that would be defined as “abnormal” by
financial statement preparers and users, and/or (b) the materiality threshold of 1% of assets used for computing
MARAs may be too small, thereby producing excessive positive/negative MARA. As indicated earlier, if financial
statements receive clean audit opinion, ARA should then theoretically be within the bounds of materiality.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

TO

IMPROVE

TRANSPARENCY

OF

Prior studies (based on pre-SOX data) indicated that internal control weaknesses adversely influenced the
quality of accruals, suggesting that MICW companies could more easily manage earnings. In contrast, our analyses
indicate no significant difference in the quality of revenue-accruals between EIC and MICW companies, suggesting
the PCAOB’s positive influence (see Table 1).
PCAOB’s Positive Impact
Our findings relating to revenue-accruals for MICW companies indicate a potentially positive impact of
PCAOB regulation on audit quality and the quality of revenue-accruals, particularly for MICW companies. In
addition to PCAOB standards, improved audit quality may have resulted from the PCAOB’s periodic inspection of
audits. For example, a review of a few “Settled Disciplinary Orders” of the PCAOB (effective between May 24,
2005 and May 22, 2012)5, revealed many audit deficiencies, including:





Auditor failed to audit accounts which were flagged as susceptible to material misstatements
Failure to perform procedures adequately for product returns which were underestimated (thereby
overstating revenue)
Auditor allowed immediate recognition of loan origination fee and mortgage fee instead of requiring
management to amortize those over the life of loan
Auditor increased the planned (tolerable) materiality by approximately 50% (from 5% to 7½% of pre-tax
income) to permit overstatement of earnings.

Implications and Recommended Reporting Changes
Despite the positive impact of the SOX Act and PCAOB standards and inspections, our analyses of
financial statements receiving unqualified audit opinions indicate some level of earnings management. To mitigate
earnings management, regulators should consider the proposal (containing nine-points) put forth by the former SEC
Chairman, Arthur Levitt, Jr., which included the auditor’s use of the materiality concept (JofA 1998). Auditors can
change the upper-bound of the range used for materiality to evaluate uncorrected misstatements. Consequently,
auditors might voluntarily, or due to pressure from company management, unjustifiably extend the upper-bounds of
tolerable materiality and allow an otherwise material uncorrected misstatement into the financial statements.
The auditor is required to document all uncorrected misstatements that are not “clearly trivial” (PCAOB
AS14) and communicate uncorrected misstatements to those charged with governance (PCAOB Interim Standard
AU 380); but, these uncorrected misstatements are not disclosed in the financial statements. However, these
uncorrected misstatements could be material from a users’ perspective. As Mr. Levitt indicated, missing an earnings
projection by a penny, for example, can result in a loss of millions of dollars in market capitalization. Consequently,

5

For the PCAOB’s ‘Settled Disciplinary Orders’ reached with registered firms or their associated persons, visit
http://pcaobus.org/Enforcement/Decisions/Pages/default.aspx
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non-disclosure of uncorrected misstatements might cause an “information-gap” between users of accounting
information and management, the information providers.
A suggested approach to narrow (if not close) this “information-gap” is to disclose uncorrected
(quantitative and qualitative) misstatements even if such misstatements are considered immaterial by auditors.
Management should be required to disclose in sufficient detail (by way of a separate footnote or pro forma
statements) known and likely uncorrected misstatements affecting income, assets, liabilities, and stockholders’
equity for current and prior periods. Further, Mr. Levitt indicated that SEC review and enforcement teams focus on
companies with red flags that indicate potential for managing earnings. When enforcement teams are not permitted
to examine companies’ red flag items, such situations should be disclosed to financial statements users. For
example, if PCAOB inspection teams are not permitted to inspect auditors’ work, such situations should be
adequately and immediately disclosed. Examples would include, the PCAOB’s inability to examine audit
documentation relating to some foreign entities' revenue, assets, and equity.
Mr. Levitt’s nine-point plan also included a need for a quick action by standard setters where current
accounting and/or auditing standards are inadequate. For example, management and auditors should be required to
identify situations when specific accounting standards are either inadequate or alternative application of the
standards would result in substantially different results (e.g., situations involving fair values). In such situations,
management should provide a description of the alternative application and its resulting outcome/implication for
users in a footnote or pro-forma statement. Also, the PCAOB should require an explanatory paragraph after the
opinion paragraph in the auditor’s report, when appropriate, to draw users’ attention to footnotes or pro forma
information included in the financial statements disclosing uncorrected misstatements.
The Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession to the US Department of the Treasury also addressed
the auditor’s report by recommending that the PCAOB and SEC clarify the auditor’s role in detecting fraud under
current auditing standards (The U.S. Department of the Treasury 2008). In this regard, the PCAOB could consider
adapting an audit report format similar to the format recommended by the AICPA’s clarified auditing standard AUC Section 700. The clarified audit report format incorporates management’s responsibility for implementing controls
to detect material misstatements due to fraud or error, and auditors’ responsibility for designing audit procedures
that include assessment of the risks of material misstatement of the financial statements, whether due to fraud or
error.
The PCAOB should consider incorporating wording of auditors’ responsibility for fraud detection into the
auditor’s report.6 Recent empirical studies based on perceptions of auditors and users, found that users prefer
wording of the auditor’s report to include the auditor’s responsibility for fraud detection (Foster et. al., 2011; Gist, et
al. 2005). Following through with the recommendations of former SEC Commissioner Levitt and the Advisory
Committee on the Auditing Profession would enhance the information content of financial reports and narrow the
information gap between providers and users of information.
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The PCAOB recently held a meeting on November 15-16, 2012 to discuss (among other matters) the format and content of the
standard Auditor's Report.
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